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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(3)(j). This 
appeal is from a final judgment in the 4th District Court, State of Utah, Utah County, 
Provo Division, by Honorable Judge James R. Taylor. Appellant has not filed any Rule 
50(b) or Rule 59 motions. Appellant has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) on 
December 28, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: 
Can a jury demand be considered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or mechanically 
waved through action of law, when: 
the jury demand was properly requested in the initial filing of the complaint; 
prior counsel for appellant paid all the fees as requested by the clerk of courts; 
prior counsel for appellant informed appellant that jury demand had been properly 
made; 
court first informed the appellant, now pro se, at the first hearing scheduled on the 
matter that the jury fee had not been recorded; 
demand for jury was renewed and paid prior to scheduling for trial and 5 months 
prior to the trial; and 
interlocutory stay and appeal were applied for to challenge the denial of jury trial? 
Determinative Statutes: 
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as given 
by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
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(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury 
by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor 
in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days 
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be 
endorsed upon a pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues which he 
wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all 
the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues, any 
other party, within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the court 
may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact 
in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as required 
by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial 
by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn 
without the consent of the parties. 
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action 
shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues 
so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(a)(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or 
by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by 
the court sitting without a jury, or 
(a)(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of 
some or all of those issues does not exist, or 
(a)(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be 
tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an 
action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its 
discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court 
upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with 
the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same 
effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. 
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UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b) 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the 
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for 
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order 
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period 
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after 
the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the 
conditions stated in them. 
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) 
b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Determinative Law: 
Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 P.3d (2006 UT App 303); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 
2d 210, 390 P.2d 127, 128 (1944); Hunter v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198 P.2d 245, 247 
(1948). Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665 (1944) 
Issue 2: 
Whether party pro se can be granted trial by jury? 
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Determinative Statutes: 
UT. Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(text cited above) 
Determinative Law: 
Or em City v. Bovo, 76 P.3d 1170 (2003 UT App 286) 
Issue 3: 
Whether one private party can sue another private party for malicious prosecution? 
Determinative Statutes: 
U.C.A. §78-3-4, Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the 
rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court 
prior to M y 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the 
judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department of the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under 
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review: 
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in 
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in 
class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances 
only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district 
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice court; or 
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(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal 
episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
(9) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78, Chapter 3h, Child 
Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district court. 
U.C.A. 78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No 
action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment 
or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and 
effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
Determinative Law: 
KoolvLee, 134 P. 906, (UT 1913) 
Issue 4: 
Whether a defaulting party can effectually be found to have rebutted a prima facie case 
based on a non-defaulting party? 
Determinative Statutes: 
UT. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the 
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be 
made certain by computation. 
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(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall 
apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an 
investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such 
references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of 
default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply 
whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party 
plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a 
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall 
be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
Determinative Law: 




U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Determinative Law: 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) 
Issue 6: 
Whether a Court's finding of "no cause of action" is sufficient findings of facts and 
conclusions of law to specially constitute the grounds of its action. 
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Determinative Statutes: 
UT. Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings 
may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the 
district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of 
fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Determinative Law: 
Bailey v. Bayles,l& P.3d 1129 (UT App. 2001) ; Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. 
Pine-crest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, Course, and Disposition of these Proceedings 
Plaintiff is a Grandparent who had not seen his Grandchildren in more than a year 
because his daughter-in-law had fled her marriage taking those children with her and 
remaining in hiding under the help of women's protective shelters and family members on 
her side of the family. Plaintiff sought Grandparent visitation through the Courts. 
Several court dates ensued as a result of Plaintiff s visitation request and during one of 
those court sessions the parties were told by the Judge that the visitation for the father and 
Grandparents would be unsupervised unless the daughter-in-law could show that the 
Grandparents posed some kind of threat. Within the next few days two different police 
reports which included written statements from the Defendants alleging various domestic 
violence related actions on the part of the Plaintiff were filed with law enforcement. 
Plaintiff claimed these were false reports. One report alleged an assault and another 
alleged that the Plaintiff was essentially stalking his daughter-in-law. The reports 
resulted in only one charge of disorderly conduct filed against the Plaintiff, which was 
subsequently dismissed. 
Represented by Attorney number 1, Plaintiff filed his original complaint for 
various causes of action requesting a "trial by Jury." Fuller v. Myers et al 040401694 
and paid all the fees requested by the Clerk. 
Attorney number 1 then withdrew from representation. Plaintiff acting pro se 
subsequently sent discovery requests to Defendants and months latter appeared 
representing himself in a motions hearing trying to compel discovery relating to his 
% 
completely unanswered requests for discovery I lie trial Judge at tlu • .^ \ first of si ich 
motion hearings then informed Plaintiff that he felt that a pro se plaintiff could not handle 
a jury trial and that there was also a question of whether or not the jury fee had been paid. 
Judge also suggested that the Plaintiff should obtain counsel. Plaintiff then renewed his 
demand for a Jury, paid some more fees, and subsequently hired Attorney number 2. 
Plaintiff then filed another renewed request for Jury which was ultimately denied. 
Plaintiff then filed his motion for stay and request for interlocutory appeal challenging 
the denial. That request was also denied and hi-- ,n rwnvni> •• »i navin >• un trial were 
not heard by the Court of Appeals. A bench trial went forward resulting in a dismissal of 
all charges against defendants, but a written order did not follow for several months. 
Attorney number 2 then withdrew from representation. Plaintiff then filed his own 
version of a written order including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Judge 
ultimately signed the order dismissing the complaint, but crossed out all findings of fact 
and conclusions of law except stating "no cause of action." Plaintiff subsequently filed a 
Rule 52 motion to amend the order to include findings and later filed a request to submit 
for decision on the motion. The Rule 52 motion has still not been addressed by the Trial 
Court. Fuller v. Myers et. at 04(MM •/>*a 
Relevant Facts 
In the trial court in the malicious prosecution case one of the causes of action did 
arise on October 7, 2003 diiring a Protective Order Hearing at the Fourth District Juvenile 
Court, concerning custody and visitation of minor children. Official Certified Transcript, 
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Pg 8, In. 12-20 page 9 In. 18,-20 Case No 430165 Beverly Lowe, Csr/CCT. (attached 
Page 1, and Page 8,9) 
Plaintiff, alleged in his complaint that Defendants had twice fabricated lies to file 
false police reports against the Plaintiff in an attempt to gain advantage in a divorce and 
custody matter. In one of the false police reports, Defendants alleged that Plaintiff had 
stalked his daughter-in-law. That complaint eventually became listed on the police 
records as a "false" police report filed by Mayna Fuller. Case No. 200309721, Provo 
Police Department Crime Report (Oct. 29, 2003). The second case resulted from an 
alleged incident in the court room where Defendant Krik Myers along with all of Mayna 
Fuller's family, the other Defendants in this case, had filed statements with the police 
alleging that Plaintiff had somehow attacked and assaulted Krik Myers in the open court 
room. Plaintiff disputed their allegations and the actual facts, films, and evidence in the 
case all showed that Plaintiff had never touched Krik Myers and Plaintiff prevailed on all 
those charges. Order Case #031404758, Fourth District, Provo Department (April 22, 
2004); also see Utah County Sheriff Crime Report Case No. 434285, (Oct. 28, 2003). 
In the trial court in the malicious prosecution case, the causes of action did arise at 
a time during another court's prbceedings in a civil matter concerning custody and 
visitation of minor children, however, the record should be clear that the causes of actions 
themselves in this case were not a part of the cases being heard by the family court on 
that day. Instead these actions (as alleged in the complaint) arose out of actions that 
could be considered an intentional and malicious tort in filing of false police reports. A 
sort of "defamation" case was considered alleged, but the more accurate title of the claim 
10 
was "malicious prosecution11 .•veruh::; Plaintiff ca!N :* • -Hseh alleged assault and battery 
situation, having nothing to do with the family court that day. Plaintiff was seeking 
specific money damages at the trial court in this matter. 
Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 19, 2004, through the aid of his counsel at 
the time. Included in the original complaint was a written demand for trial by jury and 
notice was given to opposing counsel. Although Plaintiffs former counsel was paid to 
file the claim and pay all the fees with the court, Plaintiff counsel evidently did not pay 
enough money for all the possible fees. Hie record .l:n % nut -.now a cover sheet, which 
would have been helpful in explaining what fees were actually due at filing. 
Plaintiff was unaware that his counsel did not pay the statutory jury fee at the time 
of filing, and no notice of that was made to Plaintiff until much later. Counsel for 
Plaintiff withdrew very shortly after filing the complaint. Plaintiffs original counsel 
never made it known to Plaintiff that the fee for the jury request had not been paid. To the 
contrary, Counsel specifically told Plaintiff that all the fees had been paid. Plaintiff then 
began representing himself In his malicious prosecution con^bin! and after a some^ h:i» 
lengthy discovery process, Plaintiff pro se had filed discovery requests and requests to 
compel. Counsels for Defendants had not answered one single request for the discovery 
as late as October of 2005. Plaintiff then filed motions for contempt and requested a 
scheduling and pretrial conference which was held on the 3rd of October, 2005 wherein 
during such conference, the trial court Judge first made Plaintiff aware that the jury fee 
had not been paid. Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 38, In. 9, CD#05-44-402, Penny C. 
Abbott, Reporter-1 ranscriber. 
The Judge told Plaintiff, still Pro se, that he would consider allowing a trial by 
Jury, if Plaintiff was going to get himself an attorney and properly argue his case for why 
a jury trial was proper and had not been waived. Pg. 37. In. 8, Id.. A minute entry of the 
October scheduling conference was entered into the record indicating that Plaintiff had 
renewed his request for jury trial. 
Another Oral argument was then held on November 23, 2005 wherein the Judge 
decided to ignore the jury request that had been made in May 19, 2004 without stating 
any reason for not considering it. The Judge instead chose to take the October 11, 2005 
renewed jury demand as the one and only Jury demand. Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 
7, In. 10-12, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. The Judge then 
went on that if the Plaintiff would obtain counsel, that he would "reconsider" allowing 
the jury trial. Pg. 11, ln.22 Id. 
Also during the November 23, 2005 hearing, the judge noted that apparently one 
Defendant, Krik Myers, had answered the initial complaint and then Attorney Rose 
Blakelock accepted the duties of Counsel for representing Defendant Krik Myers (Pg. 14, 
In. 8-9 Id.). There is no record that she ever withdrew or substituted counsel, but 
Attorney Jube for the other Defendants merely suggested to the Judge that it might have 
just been a "typo" and that Attorney Blakelock (not present at this hearing) didn't really 
mean to represent Defendant Myers. 
A pretrial conference was then held in the court on January, 13, 2006, which was 
Plaintiffs first opportunity to be heard while represented by his new counsel on any of 
the pretrial issues. On January 18, 2006, Plaintiffs new counsel filed another renewed 
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demand for jury trial in ih nu of a motion with SUPP< >»iini: memorandum arguing 
among other things inadvertence and/or ignorance as to the paying of the fee and waiver. 
Attorney Rose Blakelock filed a memorandum in opposition on or about January 24, 
2006. Plaintiff filed his reply memorandum on January 30, 2006. At the time of filing the 
second renewed demand, the trial date had already been set for March 27 and 28 of 2006. 
Other Defendants had 10 * hy opportunity to file their own memorandum, but did not. A 
final ruling denying the motion for trial by jury was entered on March 7, 2006. At a final 
pretrial held - * >iur\ i -006, the court ruled that any motion for default on the part 
of Defendant Krik Myers was also denied. 
Summary of Argument 
Plaintiff contends that he had a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, but that 
he was denied all his constitutional rights of due process in not allowing him to even 
present his case and in the instance of at least one defaulting party should have received a 
judgment in his favor. 
Detail of Argument 
Issue 1: knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or mechanically waving trial 
by jury through action of law 
Plaintiff has very straight forward arguments on this issue: either the Judge erred 
in determining that Plaintiff rights to trial by jury had been waived; or the Judged abused 
his discretion for not even considering any evidence of how * * h\ i p«r tiewlar fee may 
or may not have been collected by the Clerk of Courts upon filing a demand for Jury. 
B 
In this case, the trial Court would not even entertain whether a jury trial was the 
proper way to resolve the case, because the Judge erroneously used only a one-part test to 
determine that the jury right had already been waived despite the demand having been 
made with the filing of the initial complaint. 
The right to a jury trial in civil actions is guaranteed by the Constitution (U.C.A. 
1953, Const. Art. 1, § 10 ). However, that right is dependent upon timely demand and is 
limited to actions 'at law,' as distinguished from proceedings 'in equity.' City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 526 U.S. 687, 688 (U.S.Cal.1999) see also U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 7. In Utah specifically, "A careful reading, however, of the proceedings 
of the constitutional convention, Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Convention, 1895, Vol. I, Pages 258-62, 274-97, 492-95, discloses a virtually unanimous 
intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right to 
trial by jury in civil cases." International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and 
Implement, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah, 1981). "In general, parties bringing legal claims have a 
right to a jury trial, while parties bringing equitable claims do not." Id. at 399.quoting 
Goldberg v. Jay Timmons & Assocs., 896 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah App.1995). In actions 
involving both legal and equitable issues, there is a right to jury trial on the legal issues. 
Therefore, on proper motion, the court must order that the legal issues be tried separately 
to preserve the right to jury trial. 
Jury trial was the proper way to resolve the issues before this court. We can look 
at some similar cases for example as far back as 1913; a Judge submitted a malicious 
prosecution case to the Jury on the basis, " the court, in submitting the case to the jury, 
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among other things, charged MUM V: - ^ "u'7-*;* •:* iiicLLL-d lor HUM ->oth -abuse of 
legal process, and the plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a criminal process was issued against her substantially as alleged in her 
complaint, and that after it was issued the defendant caused said process to be used, not 
for the purpose of vindicating the criminal law, but for [another purpose]1" Kool v. Lee, 
134 P. 906 (UT App I4)! <) 
In Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629 (UT 2006), there was a two part test, stating 
"Pete [Plaintiff] did not make a jury demand or pa>< the ji ir> fee within ten days of service 
of Youngblood's [Defendant's] answer. Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629, 639 (UT 2006) 
emphasis added. In that case it was the lack of timely demand that was the deciding 
factor. 
In James Mfg. Co. V. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127 (UT 1964) again the demand was the 
over riding factor. "It appears that defendant did not make a demand for a jury as 
provided in Rule 38, U.R.C.P." James Mfg. Co. V. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127 (UT 1964) 
emphasis added. 
Perhaps the best statement of the two step process was laid out clear back in 
Thompson v. Anderson,l53 P.2d 665 (UT App 1944) where the coun - L "In civil 
actions a jury is waived unless demanded, Utah Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 10; Sec. 104-
-26—1, U. C. A. 1943, and even then, unless the demand is made in the manner provided 
by statute, it is unavailing. Sec. 104—23—6, U. C. A. 1943, provides: 'Either party to an 
action who desires a jury trial of the same must demand it, either by written notice to the 
clerk prior to the imu of sotting Midi action for trial, o> uji^ '• such reasonable time 
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thereafter as the court may order."' Thompson v. Anderson,l53 P.2d 665, 668 (UT App 
1944). And in Hunter v. Michaelis, 198 P.2d 245 (UT. App. 1948) when citing from 
Thompson, the court again looked to the demand as the over arching procedural factor 
for satisfying the "timely" portion of the Rule. 
As with all of the other State Administrative services, if a fee is not paid, that 
Administrative body will first give notice of the missing fee and then if and only if the 
fee is not paid prior to or "at the time" the service is being provided, is the written request 
deemed void for lack of the fee.1 
In this case, Plaintiff did make the demand, the Clerk of Courts receiving the 
complaint accepted the filing and fee payments, Counsel for Plaintiff at the time told 
Defendant that he had paid the fee, and the Demand was noticed to all parties and to 
opposing counsel. If somehow the Clerk got shorted some money, then who is to say 
which particular fee was not paid; was it the filing fee that was shorted or was it the Jury 
fee? There were no records presented to the Judge and he had no way of knowing what 
the situation was on fee payments. Instead, the Judge merely obviated his dislikes for the 
Pro Se Plaintiff and sought to find some reason, even if not supported by any facts, to just 
disallow the Plaintiffs demand for a jury. 
Compare Utah Administrative Code: The Utah Administrative Code is "evidence of the administrative 
law of the state of Utah" and an "authorized compilation of the administrative law of Utah" (Section 63-
46a-16). Compare also Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, "Rule 4-202.08. Fees for 
records, information, and services: (1) Fees payable. Fees are payable to the court or office that provides 
the record, information, or service at the time the record, information, or service is provided." 
Emphasis added. 
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There was no showing in this case whether the fee was paid or not. There was no 
entering of evidence for the Court of fee receipts to show that the fee had not been paid. 
It was only the Judge, not even opposing counsel, who offered testimony in a preliminary 
hearing that he felt the fee had not been paid. It was either plain error in finding that the 
Jury demand had been waived, or it was abuse of discretion by the Judge. By not taking 
in. any considerations of llv circumstances whereby he could adequately consider the 
sufficiency of a jury demand, where: prior counsel for appellant paid all the fees as 
requested by the clerk of courts; prior counsel for appellant l *nned appellant thatjury 
demand had been properly made; court first informed the Plaintiff/Appellant of its 
contention at the very first hearing on the matter that the jury fee had not been recorded; 
and the demand for jury was renewed and paid prior to scheduling for trial and 5 months 
prior to the trial, the Court substantially violated the Plaintiffs Constitutional rights. 
Issue 2: Whether party pro se can be granted trial by jury? 
It was abuse of discretion to disallow Pro se party to represent himself. Again, the 
arguments to this issue arc quite Ucur -.Kid -.miplc Parties represented b\ an aUorne\ do 
not necessarily have their cases presented any better than if self-represented. As a 
general statement, it is true that attorneys have had superior training, but as was evident 
in this case that in the end none of the Plaintiffs attorneys exhibited superior skills. 
Plaintiff may be a country boy at heart, but had spent several years in the military 
where interpretation of the rules and regulations was a full time job for him. Plaintiff can 
study rules and cases and draft pleadings in his own words and then seek professional 
writers to correct the uranmar and s\ nta\ Plaintiff could have then even employed a 
friend, legal assistant, paralegal, clerk or really any capable person (attorney or non-
attorney) to merely help him while not actually representing him during the trial. 
Instead, when Plaintiffs original attorney who had health problems and had moved 
his practice to a different city, Plaintiff was forced to hire another attorney only because 
of the Judges orders. That last minute attorney was ill prepared at the time of trial to 
fully represent Plaintiffs case, as a direct result. Furthermore, Plaintiff only hired an 
attorney because the Judge told him he would likely get his trial by Jury if he did hire an 
attorney. Instead, the hiring of an attorney was just a further assurance that the Judge 
would get the outcome the judge was after. 
The Utah Court of Appeals made it clear in the Bovo case that it is never a good 
practice for the Judge to be making the decisions for a party appearing before him which 
are constitutionally reserved for that Part]/ to decide for themselves. Under our law, 
parties are not required to make futile objections in order to preserve a future claim. See 
Orem City v. Bovo, 76 P.3d 1170, ffl[13, 16 (2003 UT App 286). Thus, because the trial 
court first erred by concluding that the Pro Se party was incapable of presenting his case 
before a jury, we cannot say that Plaintiff waived his right to a Jury. 
Issue 3: Whether one private party can sue another private party for 
malicious prosecution? 
This third issue is straight forward and important to this appeal, because the Trial Court 
Judge refused to enter any written findings in his final order. We have to turn to the record of 
the trial to see what the Trial Judge did and whether there were any findings to support what he 
did with his order of dismissal. 
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The fact that the Judge would not even entertain the idea u n one pr-v.-.v pam couKI sue 
another private party in malicious prosecution became a matter of that trial court record. But 
r ; ;.-,•:•'!"contends thai he du .-. vc a , an v of aenon, therefore the errors at the trial court were 
not harmless. It is simply plain error in the law for the Court to have: excluded so much of the 
evidence on relevance grounds; holding that the evidence couldn't be relevant to the case in 
controversy; and finding no cause of action in malicious prosecution when one private party 
makes false police reports against another private party. Such a decision should be reviewed de 
novo. 
The errors began when the Judge made the bench ruling that the two day trial was going 
to be only a one day trial and at least two of the Plaintiffs key witnesses was not available until 
the next morning. See Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 149, In. 25, CD#05-60-402, Penny 
C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. The judge essentially did not want to hear any evidence 
about whether the Defendants lied in their statements made to the police. 
The facts in this case could not have been more clear that the Defendants had lied 
to the police in their written statements. Instead of taking any of those facts into 
consideration or determining whether the Defendants had lied, the Judge decided it was 
better to rule on the seniatn^ - * * u iher a statement t*> *hi • • • 've conhj be a false police 
report at all and ruling that those statements could not be considered a police report. 
For example, the opposing counsel stipulated that Deieiuianf -Elements to the 
police were "without basis and unfounded" and the Judge would not rule whether or not 
those lies could constitute a "false police report." Official Certified Transcript, pg. I 12, 
In 8 - pg. 119, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. 
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Instead the Judge forced an imaginative interpretation of "Restatement 653" 
saying that "to get to malicious prosecution you have to have charges filed and then you 
have to show that the moving factor in the decision to make the prosecution was the 
desire of the tort-feasor [or] alleged tort-feasor." Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 118, 
In. 23 - pg. 119, In. 3, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. 
The Judge's Bench rulings in the trial record suggested that making false 
statements to the police cannot be a false police report, that evidence about any motive 
and relationship between the Defendants was not going to be heard, and that the court 
was not going to consider credibility, veracity, or even circumstances to Defendant 
Mayna Fuller's relationship to Defendant Krik Myers. Defendant Mayna Fuller was 
clearly pregnant that day in the court room and from other testimony it was known that 
Defendant Mayna Fuller's husband Jonathan Fuller was not the father of the child. Yet, 
the Judge would not allow any line of questioning concerning the unborn child or her 
relationship with Defendant Krik Myers as to their motives to obtain supervised visitation 
in their child custody matter. 
Even if Defendants were lying in the court room about her relationship with 
Defendant Krik Myers, the Judge was simply not going to hear it. The judge truly did 
rule that a malicious prosecution case was reserved only for actions brought against the 
police department or prosecuting attorneys. 
Plaintiff wanted justice. Whether the complaint was called defamation, malicious 
prosecution, or any other matter in tort, it just should not have mattered. The case was 
simply that Plaintiff wanted redress for Defendants making all of their false statements to 
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the police, which did eventually result in charges being brought against the Plaintiff, 
which charges were ultimately dismissed. 
If the Judge was not specifically going to address a case for malicious prosecution, 
he could have addressed any tort by any other name, but instead it became a matter of the 
Trial Court record that the Judge found that there was no redress or remedy for when the 
parties in divorce and custody litigation seek to use the police for improper purposes. 
Plaintiff, however, contends here that the trial court was in error to that regard. 
A case for malicious prosecution is found in common law and has not been 
modified by the Utah Code or Case law. Just because a particular cause of action is 
uncommon, does not make it a non-existent cause of action. A plaintiff may state a cause 
of action for abuse of process against a person "'who uses a legal process . . . against 
another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.1" Gilbert v. Ince, 
1999 UT 65, U 17, 981 P.2d 841 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, at 474 
(1977)); see also Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 455, 519 P.2d 888, 890 
(1974); Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394, 403-04, 134 P. 906, 909 (1913); Keller v. Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F.Supp. 1563, 1571 (D.Utah 1995); 1 RonaldE. Mallen & 
Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 6.22 cmt. d, at 465 (4th ed. 1996) ("A cause of 
action for abuse of process requires pleading and proof of two elements: (1) the use of 
legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose not within the scope of the proceeding 
for which it was designed; and (2) malice." (footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter Legal 
Malpractice]; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. b, at 475 (1977) ("For abuse of 
process to occur there must be use of the process for an immediate purpose other than 
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that for which it was designed and intended."); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 57 cmt. d, at 432 (rev. ed. 2000) ("A damaged party may recover for abuse of 
process from one 'who uses a legal process whether criminal or civil, against another 
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.'" 
Although there were disputed facts at the trial court in the present case, the 
Plaintiff and Defendants were family members on opposing sides in separate matters in 
divorce, custody, and juvenile court matters concerning Plaintiffs grandchildren. 
Plaintiff certainly alleged and presented evidence at the trial court to make out his prima 
facie case that the police reports (statements to the police) were false. 
Plaintiff also presented evidence that supported the false reports were for purposes 
other than what criminal charges were meant to be used for. Plaintiff presented that the 
false police reports were used to gain an advantage in the divorce and custody matter to 
prevent the grandparents from being able to be involved in their grandchildren's lives, 
which is certainly not a use those statutes were designed and intended. 
In these types of divorce cases, it may seem common place that one party or the 
other seeks to file false police reports in efforts to obtain restraining orders or other 
means by which they can gain a "leg up" in the divorce proceedings, shifting the burden 
of parental fitness, and basically practicing a divorce by ambush strategy. The use of 
such tactics has become a rampant and common place strategy now for attorneys in the 
District courts. The tactic is to accuse a spouse or the spouses family and most of the 
time this accusation is made in an attempt to gain (or re-gain) control of custody 
proceedings. 
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When such police reports are found to be false or lacking, however, finding of a 
remedy for the aggrieved parties is difficult or impossible in the family courts. The best 
an aggrieved party can hope for is that the Divorce court will see through the power play 
for what it is and award custody and/or visitation accordingly. Unfortunately, the redress 
for the abuse of the legal processes in the family courts has been extremely limited if not 
outright non-existent, allowing for this abuse to go unchecked. 
Therefore Plaintiff, as the aggrieved party, brought his case for abuse of process in 
the form of a malicious prosecution cause of action and sought to make his case at trial 
for the abuse of the legal process and malice on the part of Defendants. 
If the trial court judge found it distasteful, then perhaps a better remedy should 
have been availed to the litigants in the family courts, but under current family court 
practices, remedies are not available. See generally Utah Code — Title 30 « Husband and 
Wife. Unless and until the State of Utah has statutorily laid out other such remedies, it 
was both plain error and abuse of discretion for the Trial Court Judge to have simply 
dismissed Plaintiffs abuse of process claims merely because such an action was 
extremely uncommon. 
Issue 4: Whether a defaulting party can effectually be found to have 
rebutted a prima facie case based on a non-defaulting party? 
In this case the one Defendant who was alleged to have instigated, initiated, and 
solicited the false statements to the police, never properly answered and then never 
showed up to court. If there was one thing absolutely clear in this case, it was that 
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Defendant Krik Myers merely answered his complaint unsigned and then proceeded to 
simply ignore the remainder of the process entirely. 
Even to this day, both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have no record of 
the Defendant's whereabouts. He has defaulted by every meaning of the word. He has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend and that fact was made abundantly clear to the Trial 
Court. See U.R.C.P. R. 55. 
The case in Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) 
fairly well makes out the current law in matters of Default. The Utah Supreme court 
stated in its opinion: 
When a defendant fails to appear and answer a complaint, 
the entry of a default does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a 
default judgment for the damages claimed in the complaint. There 
is an important distinction between a default and a default 
judgment. Rule 55 provides for the entry of default by the clerk of 
the court whenever a party "has failed to plead or otherwise defend 
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1). In other words, all that must be shown for the 
entry of a default is that the defendant has failed to answer the 
complaint in a timely fashion. See 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 
55.11[3][a] (3d ed.1997). 
A clerk of the court may enter a default judgment if a 
defendant defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a "sum 
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain." 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b). However, if the damages claimed are 
unliquidated, a default judgment can be entered only by a judge. 
See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). To enter 
a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge must review 
the complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim 
for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by 
some valid evidence. In other words, the allegations in the 
complaint are not a sufficient basis for awarding unliquidated 
damages. See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984). That 
usually means a hearing must be held so that the plaintiff can 
provide evidentiary support for the award of damages. 
Moreover, a default judgment is valid only if the well-pled 
facts show that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The uncontroverted allegations of the complaint must be 
sufficient on their face to establish a valid claim against the 
defaulting party. See American Towers Owners Assoc, v. CCI 
Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1194 (Utah 1996); Cripps v. Life 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir.1992); Nishimatsu 
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th 
Cir.1975). Only well-pled facts alleged in the pleadings of the 
nondefaulting party are binding and can support the default 
judgment. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th 
Cir.1978). Although factual allegations are deemed admitted, a 
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plaintiffs legal allegations are not binding. See Nishimatsu Constr. 
Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. Accordingly, a court may grant relief only if a 
valid legal basis supported by well-pled facts is asserted in the 
complaint. See CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d at 1194; 10 Moore's 
Federal Practice § 55.12[1] (3d ed.1997). On appeal from a default 
judgment, a defendant may contest "the sufficiency of the complaint 
and its allegations to support the judgment." Nishimatsu Constr. 
Co.,515F.2dat1206. 
Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope 8A, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) 
In the present case there were no liquidated damages and therefore default 
judgment entry by the judge was available for the Plaintiff where the Defendant failed t( 
properly appear or plead. The court had only the nondefaulting Plaintiff and the other 
nondefaulting Defendants before him. 
Issue 5: Ineffective Counsel 
Plaintiff cites authority to Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) whc 
relied on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2 
674 (1984), stating "[T]he United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for 
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of couns< 
has been violated. We have adopted that test as follows: To prevail, a defendant must 
show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
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manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Bundy v. 
Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); see, e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186— 
87 (Utah 1990); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986)." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) citing from 
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984). 
In this case Attorney # 1 failed to pay all the required fees upon filing the 
complaint. Attorney # 1 also filed a complaint that was completely vague as to the cause 
of action against one primary Defendant, Plaintiffs Daughter-in-law, Mayna Fuller. 
Attorney # 2, then came to court ill prepared to present and argue the case, failing to 
assert any damages prior to closing the case for the Plaintiff and essentially admitting that 
the court had caught him "with his pants down and did not bring the damages." Official 
Certified Transcript, Pg. 165, In. 11-12; and counsel's argument in general pgs. 162-
175, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. 
Issue 6: Sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment.' The findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The 
findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" 18 P.3d 
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1129; Bailey v. Bayles; 2001 UT App 34, quoting from Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. 
Corp. v. Pine-crest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
It was Plaintiffs understanding that the Judge asked the attorney for the 
Defendants, Rose Blakelock, to prepare an order to submit to Court and that she agreed to 
do so. According to Rule 7 it says, " the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after 
the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the 
court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after 
service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served 
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
Attorney for the Defendants must have been so overwhelmed with work to file the 
order that the Trial Judge asked her to do., that it never got filed. Then when Plaintiff, Pro 
se, 6 months plus later filed a proposed order, none of the parties objected. It seems that 
the Judge who finally got the order and then took it upon himself to simply "scratch" out 
all findings of the court, did not have proper basis to do so according to the Rules of Civil 
procedure. Plaintiff requests that the portions of the order which were stricken should be 
restored to the proposed language as submitted. 
Concluding Statement Including Statement of Relief Sought 
With the numerous errors at the Trial Court including: improperly denied jury 
demand; disrespect for pro se litigants; raising the standard for an abuse of process claim 
by adding elements that do not exist; allowing a defaulting party to avoid justice; 
ineffective counsel; and ultimately failing to make any proper findings of fact or 
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conclusions of law; this case should be reversed or at the very least remanded for jury 
trial. 
An abuse of process claim only requires that the Plaintiff meet two fairly simple 
elements: (1) the use of legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose not within the 
scope of the proceeding for which it was designed; and (2) malice. Instead of following 
the law in this case, the Trial Court Judge seemingly decided (although we have no 
written findings) to add more elements to the cause of action. The Judge found that 
Defendants filing lffalse statements'1 with the police could not be deemed filing "false 
police reports" and that the Defendants had to put some kind of "pressure" on the 
prosecutor in order to meet the required elements. Official Certified Transcript, Pg. 171, 
In. 10 - Pg. 172, In. 22, CD#05-60-402, Penny C. Abbott, Reporter-Transcriber. 
With these numerous errors in law and abuse of discretion, justice has not been 
served in this matter. Plaintiff respectfully requests reverse and/or remand. 
Dated t h i s^ / day of #**f 2007 
BY: ft 
David Fuller, Pro Se 
Z°i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed by 
first class mail this J< I Day of June 2007 to the following: 
Rosemond G. Blakelock 
75 South 300 West 
Provo Utah 84601 
Matthew P. Jube 
75 South 300 West 
Provo Utah 84601 
Krik Myers After numerous notices sent to last known address of 290 West 500 South 
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1 visitation, if we were to order — and I don't — you haven't 
2 spoken, so I don't know your positions on them. If we were 
3 to order supervised visitation for Dad, unsupervised for the 
4 grandparents, the paternal grandparents, as determined by the 
5 guardian ad litem and the DCFS worker to work out details; is 
6 that sufficient for you, Mr. Danielson? 
7 MR. DANIELSON: Is that okay? 
8 MR. FULLER: Yes. 
9 MR. DANIELSON: That would be fine. 
10 THE COURT: Would that be acceptable to your client, 
11 Mr. DeWitt? 
12 MR. DeWITT: My client is not sure that unsupervised 
13 visitation with grandparents would be appropriate. I — 
14 THE COURT: Let me just ask you a question. Is that 
15 because of the grandparents' behavior and actions and history, 
16 or because of Dad's involvement with the grandparents? 
17 MR. DeWITT: Both, your Honor. Both. 
18 THE COURT: I don't think I saw any allegations 
19 regarding grandparents. Of course at the time she filed the 
20 I paperwork — 
21 MR. DeWITT: Right, right. 
22 THE COURT: Well, okay. It appears that Mr. DeWitt 
23 I would be suggesting that the appropriate visitation or parent 
24 time, as we now call it, would be supervised visits determined 
25 by the guardian ad litem and the DCFS worker for both the 
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paternal grandparents as well as Dad. Mr. Hilton? 
MR. HILTON: We would strongly resist supervised 
visitation for the grandparents, but I assume that's going to 
require an evidentiary hearing --
THE COURT: We probably don't have time to get into it 
MR. HILTON: I know. I'm just saying, which I guess 
we'll have to do. 
MR. DANIELSON: Your Honor, and I suppose the best 
person to determine wither or not supervised visits would be 
appropriate or not is the guardian ad litem. I think he ought 
to have a consultation with DCFS. 
THE COURT: Typically I would give some discretion 
there, but I would order visitation to be either supervised 
or unsupervised. It places him in an awkward position to try 
to make the evidentiary decisions that's been referred to. 
You know, as far as time and frequency, et cetera, 
it works better to have someone kind of negotiating that, but 
if I leave the burden on him to decide if the grandparents are 
inappropriate or appropriate, he's going to be needing to take 
some kind of statement. 
The protective order cases in these hearings come 
on so quickly that sometimes we're all here with very little 
background information. Sometimes we get a DCFS report. 
Frequently we do not. I assume we don't have a written report 
in this case? 
